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Introduction
Historical Context
After the death of Marshall Tito in 1980 and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991,
the territories making up the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia soon
dissolved into civil war. Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) was no exception, and in 1992, a
conflict involving the country’s three principle national groups—Bosniak Muslims,
Serbian Catholics, and Croatian Catholics—broke out. The conflict would continue for
nearly four bloody years, resulting in the deaths of approximately 250,000 people and the
displacement of some 2 million residents, or half the country’s population. 1 The 1995
Dayton Accords, which finally brought an end to the fighting, created a unique federal
structure with power split between three different “entities”: the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (FBiH), the Republika Srpska (RS), and the District of Brcko. FBiH is
further split into ten different districts called cantons. Because each entity has its own
government and civil structure, governance is thus shared by 13 political units, each
possessing constitutional and legislative authority, and managed by 181 ministries. 2 In
addition to domestic governing bodies, a large international peacekeeping and capacitybuilding presence remained in BiH after Dayton, with representatives from the UN,
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NATO, and the EU. Though this force has somewhat decreased over time, there are still
2,500 foreign soldiers present in the country today. 3 Such a fragmented political
environment and decentralized power structure make addressing a range of challenges,
from the transition to a market economy to restructuring the social welfare system to
addressing widespread organized crime, particularly challenging.
Human Trafficking: Disappearing, or evolving?
According to experts at NGOs, the first recorded cases of trafficking in women
and girls for forced prostitution in BiH appeared in 1995, just after the signing of the
Dayton Accords. 4 For the next seven years, the recorded number of trafficking victims in
the country grew rapidly, and as of October 2002, the UN Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (UNMIBH) suspected 227 of the bars and nightclubs dotting the country of
using trafficked women as sex workers. 5 At this time, BiH was considered both a country
of origin for trafficking victims and a transit country for women from Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union on their way to Western Europe. 6 However, after 2002, the
numbers of foreign victims of trafficking assisted began to drop dramatically; last year,
the total number of victims assisted was only 41. 7 Nevertheless, while the number of
foreign victims of trafficking assisted has steadily declined, the number of domestic
victims assisted has steadily risen. In this sense, last year also marked an important
turning point, in that for the first time there were more documented cases of domestic
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trafficking, or internal trafficking, rather than trafficking across international borders. 8
Thus, while BiH is no longer considered a major transit country or destination country for
foreign women being trafficked into forced prostitution, it is increasingly becoming a
country of origin. 9 Such developments suggest that human trafficking activity has not
disappeared in BiH; rather, its forms and mechanisms have merely shifted with the times.

Methods
To conduct this research, I relied upon a number of articles and reports from
international organizations on trafficking in southeastern Europe. For the gathering of
statistical data, the information provided by the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) library in Geneva proved particularly helpful. I have also drawn heavily on a
series of interviews with NGOs, law enforcement officials, and legal professionals
conducted over ten days in Sarajevo from October – November 2008, as well as informal
conversations I had with experts in the field during my time in BiH.

Trafficking Phase 1: 1995-2002
With an infrastructure in shambles; poor coordination between local law
enforcement, national law enforcement, and international peacekeeping bodies;
deplorable economic conditions; and extremely porous borders, post-conflict BiH proved
fertile grounds for organized crime and human trafficking. Human trafficking routes can
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often be set up along the same ones used for trafficking in drugs and arms, making them
relatively easy to put in place. Because trafficking in persons is a lucrative business (not
only could “owners” charge clients for sexual services provided by the women, but they
could also sell women to individuals for between US$3,000 and US$6,000) 10 , and
because hundreds of bars and brothels sprung up to service the large peace-keeping
forces and contractors brought to the country, it is of little surprise that numbers of
foreign trafficking victims identified rose sharply from 14 in 1999 to 275 in 2002.11
However, local NGOs put the actual number of victims at an even higher tally, estimating
as many as 900 nightclubs involved in prostitution with between 4 and 25 women and
girls employed in each nightclub—roughly 25 percent of whom they believe had been
trafficked. 12 Thus, some experts estimate that as many as 16,000 women and girls may
have been trafficked into the region from the end of 1995 until June 2003. 13
Victim Profile
During this period, the largest group of victims came from Moldova (44% of
victims identified), while the next largest groups came from Romania (37%) and Ukraine
(12%). 14 The women were largely from urban areas, and while the majority had a middle
school education, only a small minority had a high school education. 15 Almost all left
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home on the grounds of seeking employment abroad, most often in service industries—as
a waitress, domestic worker, au pair, etc. 16

The Operations
As most of the victims during this period came from Moldova, Romania, and
Ukraine, they were usually transported by car through Serbia, via Belgrade or
Vojvodina. 17 Upon their arrival in BiH, some women were sold at venues such as the
Arizona Market, a model free trade space in the Brcko District that became notorious for
its illicit activities—such as the sale of foreign women to pimps. 18 Others were sold
directly to club owners and informed that they now had to work as dancers and sex
workers to pay off the “debt” they had incurred, either through their travel expenses or
through their “purchase.” For most women, this meant paying off a debt ranging from
1,500 to 5,000 Deutschmarks (€769 to €2,564/U.S.$694 to U.S.$2,315); however, women
could also be sold from “owner” to “owner,” and accounting practices on the parts of the
latter were rarely fair. 19 Because owners always deprived victims of their passports and
other travel documents, and because victims were most often physically abused and
warned that consequences would follow attempts to escape, most chose to remain in their
places of captivity and hoped that the club owner would one day announce their debt
paid. The number of clients women were forced to serve each night varied greatly; while
the average hovered around 4 to 5 clients per night, some women were forced to serve as

16

Ibid, pp 148.
Surtees, pp 149.
18
Kampschror, Beth. “Bosnia’s Arizona Market Moving from ‘Wild West’ to Legitimacy.” Balkan Times,
Sarajevo, 1/31/02.
19
HRW, pp 11.
17

10

many as 20. 20 The fact that local police were often among the women’s clients, or seen
fraternizing with owners, further enhanced victims’ sense of the futility of an attempt to
escape. As one experienced International Police Task Force (IPTF) human rights officer
told Human Rights Watch, “The [trafficked women] do not trust the local police. Very
often the local police visit the clubs. They see local police every day, and some use their
sexual services sometimes for free because they have connections to the owners. So the
women don’t trust the local police.”21
While estimates vary as to exactly what proportion of the clientele they made up,
it is clear that the majority of the nightclubs’ revenue came from their international
clientele, who paid significantly higher prices for services and generally spent more
money in the bars than did locals. 22 While the European Union Police Mission (EUPM)
maintains that only 30% of the clientele at nightclubs engaged in prostitution were
internationals, NGOs counter that the proportion is closer to 50%. 23 In any event, even
the most conservative estimates pinpoint international clients as accounting for 70-80%
of the revenues at these institutions. 24 The proximity of brothels to barracks, complete
with names reflecting the nationality of the nearby barracks (Liberty Restaurant and
Malibu Bar near the American sector; Café Bashta and Rendezvous near the French
sector), would certainly seem to indicate their target clientele. 25

Trafficking M.O. Part 2: 2003-present
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Beginning in 2003, several significant patterns in victims of human trafficking
emerged. Perhaps most notably, after having risen steadily for five years, the number of
foreign victims assisted dropped off significantly between 2002 and 2003, from 275 to
92—a drop of 66.6 percent in a single year. 26 At the same time, the number of domestic
trafficking victims assisted has increased each year. There are several factors that may
have contributed to the fall in the overall number of women assisted, which will be
further explored later on in this paper.
Victim Profile
Certainly the most noteworthy trend in victims of trafficking has been the
increased proportion of BiH nationals identified among them. While no BiH nationals
were identified as trafficking victims until 2002, in 2007 39 were identified and
assisted—more than the number of foreign victims assisted that year. 27 Like foreign
victims, most of these women and girls came from urban areas, and most had attained
only a low degree of education. In fact, some figures suggest that an increasing number
of domestic victims not only have not received a high school education, but have not
received a middle school education, either. 28 A disproportionate number of domestic
victims are Roma, who account for only about one percent of the total BiH population. 29
In addition, while there is little statistical evidence to back them up, some local NGOs
claim that an increasing number of victims have either mental or physical disabilities, or
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qualify as internally displaced persons (IDPs). 30 Finally, beginning in 2004, minors
accounted for a significantly increased number of the trafficking victims identified.
Through 2003, it was believed they only represented between 10 and 17.7 percent of
victims. However, in 2004, minors spiked to 60.7 percent of all victims assisted. 31 In
2007, this figure dropped to 44 percent; all minors assisted were BiH nationals. 32
The Operations
With the rise of internal trafficking, problems of border crossings and false
documents have become less relevant to the issue of human trafficking for sexual
exploitation, though they remain problematic in the field of human smuggling. 33 The
nature of trafficking operations has also changed significantly. No longer do bars and
nightclubs seem to be the venues of choice for those engaged in human trafficking; in
fact, many of the clubs that once dotted the entire Bosnian countryside have closed their
doors. 34 For example, in the notorious Arizona Market, mentioned above, not a single
bar, brothel, or nightclub is still in operation. 35 In those venues that are still open,
domestic workers seem to have replaced foreign ones. 36 Because these women have
refused police assistance, it would seem that these bars have legitimized their operations.
Instead, beginning in 2003, law enforcement, NGOs, and local experts began to notice a
shift to the use of private apartments, hotels, or motels.37 Women and girls are kept in
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these more discreet facilities, and clients are brought to them in private taxis hired by
traffickers, often after having set up an appointment via cell phone. 38 Such operations
are much harder for the police to detect, making accurate statistical information about
trafficking victims that much harder to compile. Indeed, one cannot say for certain how
much of the significant drop in victims assisted can be attributed to a decrease in
trafficking activity and how much can be attributed to more effective trafficking
operations. 39
Traffickers have also begun to exert more sophisticated methods of control over
their victims. More and more women are being given a small salary for their work, and
some are also receiving greater freedom of movement. These, along with decreased
levels of physical and sexual abuse from traffickers, create psychological pressure for
women to stay in their situations and not to seek help. 40 This sort of
“professionalization” of the trafficking experience may be a result of the fact that
traffickers can no longer operate with the same degree of impunity as they could in the
past for reasons that will be discussed in the following section. Because trafficking is
quite simply not as easy as it used to be, those engaged in it may have to treat victims
more carefully in order to avoid detection.

Explaining the Trends: Counter-Trafficking Efforts in BiH
Over the past eight years, significant counter-trafficking activities have been
undertaken in BiH both by the international community and by Bosnian nationals. These
efforts have ranged from police operations and training, to extensive new legislation, to
38
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the creation of the Office of the State Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human
Beings and Illegal Migration, and a regularly updated State Action Plan (SAP). While
some of these efforts have been successful in accomplishing their goals, others have
suffered from uneven implementation, misdirected forces, and a lack of necessary funds.
Police action
In the early 2000’s, police counter-trafficking efforts focused largely on bar raids,
during which police would enter an institution suspected of engaging in trafficking,
demand to see the travel documents of the women working there, and take into custody
those unable to provide the necessary documentation or those requesting assistance.
While a positive step in theory, in practice raids were often unproductive because of tipoffs given to the owners in advance. 41 Perhaps the most prominent example of a police
raid gone wrong is Operation Makro (“pimp” in Bosnian).
Operation Makro took place over the course of one night in early March, 2001,
when local police raided 39 bars with the aim of revealing acts of trafficking, finding and
prosecuting traffickers, and rescuing trafficked women. 42 The media report released by
the Office of the High Representative (OHR) on March 5, following the operation,
glowed: 177 women had been “freed” from their captors, and 48 alleged traffickers were
taken into custody. 43 UNMIBH lauded the country’s law enforcement, and the operation
was hailed as proof “that police training has paid off; professionalism has been enhanced;
and the ability to work constructively together, regardless of entity or ethnic origin, is
possible.” 44
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However, the reality of the operation gave far less cause for celebration. Of the
177 women supposedly rescued during the operation, only 13 ever made it to the IOM
shelter in Sarajevo—the rest seem to have “vanished.” 45 Furthermore, as a result of
Makro, 34 foreign women and eight Bosnian nationals were charged with and found
guilty of prostitution; 14 women received prison sentences; 19 were fined; all were given
deportation orders. 46 On the other hand, the charges brought against BiH citizens for
mediating in prostitution were all dropped due to a “lack of evidence,” even though one
bar owner in Tuzla even admitted to having participated in trafficking activities. 47
Finally, there is reason to believe that the police behavior during the operation lacked
professionalism, as one IPTF officer described the entire procedure as “a mess…It was a
ragtag group of street police officers…The bar owners and employees stood in the hall
talking to the local police…the women could not feel safe with the owners and
employees socializing with the local police in the hall.” 48 Clearly, Operation Makro can
be cited as an example of how counter-trafficking operations should not be carried out.
After Operation Makro, there were some attempts to set up a more focused
counter-trafficking team. In July 2001, UNMIBH launched the UN Special Trafficking
Operation Programme (STOP), which aimed to provide more effective direct action
against traffickers. The STOP teams were controlled by the IPTF, who worked with local
police to coordinate raids. The spike in the number of victims identified and assisted in
2002 (275, up from 200 the year before) may be partially attributed to increased bar raid
activity by the STOP teams, whose raids also led directly to the closing of some bars and
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nightclubs beginning in the second half of 2001. 49 Likewise, the decline in victims
assisted in 2003, to 92, may also be partially attributed to a decrease in STOP activity as
the IPTF formally dissolved in December 2003. Not only did this transition lead to fewer
bar raids in the first several months of 2003, but it also marked a decided change in
tactics, with police now favoring more systematic and time-consuming investigations. 50
Though such investigations yield the discovery of fewer victims in the short run, they
should theoretically lead to more convictions of traffickers in the long term.
In addition to increased police efforts, two new law enforcement agencies were
created that could have had an effect on trafficking operations. The State Border Service
(SBS) was set up in 2000 to begin handling BiH’s border security; by 2005 it had taken
over control of all border zones, airports, and river crossings from international
peacekeeping forces and reported “significant progress” in its efforts to halt traffickers,
though the possibility of new routes by traffickers makes it hard to say precisely how
much tighter the borders have been made. 51 The State Investigative Protection Agency
(SIPA) was set up in 2004 as an information conduit for all domestic law enforcement
agencies and some international law enforcement agencies. While SBS has jurisdiction
over all borders and areas within 50 kilometers of a border, SIPA has jurisdiction over the
entire country and is heavily supported by EUPM forces. 52 Within SIPA, Special Teams
for the Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings and Sexual Offenses have been
formed, as well as a witness protection unit. SIPA has reported some success in
uncovering trafficking operations with tips from the nation-wide 24-hour crime hotline
49
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set up in 2004. 53 However, its witness protection unit has yet to exercise an operation,
and thus far has only transported victims to courthouses to give testimony, not out of the
country or to permanently safe locations. 54
Legislation
Since 2000, the BiH government has passed a flurry of legislation dealing with
human trafficking issues. In addition to its own Constitution, which provides for a range
of rights including not to be subjected to degrading treatment and not to be held in
slavery or servitude or perform forced labor, BiH has also ratified a number of important
international treaties, including the 2000 Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime with Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children (better known as the Palermo Protocol) and the 2005 European
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. Perhaps most significantly,
trafficking in human beings was specifically addressed in the new Criminal Code of
Bosnia-Herzegovina implemented in 2003. The Criminal Code, in Articles 186 and187,
has provisions against trafficking in persons for the purpose of sexual exploitation, labor
exploitation, and organ donation, as well as specific consequences for those who traffic
minors. Importantly, whether or not the victim originally consented to the exploitation
(many trafficking victims accept offers of “work” without realizing the true nature of the
situation) and whether or not the victim had already been engaged in prostitution is of no
relevance when charging someone with trafficking in persons—mechanisms that are in
accordance with international law. Witness Protection Program legislation was adopted
in the second half of 2004, as well as a Law on the Movement and Stay of Aliens and
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Asylum that included provisions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. Both
pieces of legislation are important instruments in building cases against traffickers.
State Action Plans
Beginning in 2001, BiH began to adopt a State Action Plan (SAP), which it
regularly updates, with the aim of coordinating administrative, legislative, and lawenforcement efforts to combat human trafficking. The first SAP, which was in effect
from 2001 to 2004, set a number of goals, including the establishment of a uniformed
state border service, legislation reform on both the state and entity levels, activities
towards capacity building of relevant professional staff, and awareness-raising among the
general public about human trafficking. 55 Though it took some time to begin the actual
implementation of the Plan, by the time the second SAP came into effect, the SBS and
SIPA had been established, Articles 186 and 187 had been written into the Criminal
Code, the STOP teams had led to the closing of numerous bars and brothels, and the
public discussion about human trafficking had begun to spread outside the large cities
and into the countryside. 56 Furthermore, in 2003, the BiH Council of Ministers
established the Office of the State Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human
Beings and Illegal Migration as the primary body responsible for overseeing the
implementation of the SAP, along with the “State Group,” which includes representatives
from relevant ministries and law enforcement agencies.
The second SAP, which came into effect in 2005 and lasted through 2007, was
built around five core areas: creating coordinated systems of support throughout the
government, prevention of trafficking, protection of and assistance to victims,
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prosecution of traffickers, and internal cooperation between all principle stakeholders. 57
More specifically, the second SAP placed an emphasis on awareness campaigns in the
form of posters, leaflets, and television/radio spots, changes in high school curriculums to
include information about trafficking, the development of witness protection programs
and the creation of a procedure for dealing with victims of internal trafficking, the
creation of an officer manual (or rulebook) for dealing with victims of trafficking known
as the Vlasic procedures, and an increased emphasis on international cooperation. The
Office of the State Coordinator worked on these projects in cooperation with a number of
other actors. For example, beginning in 2004 Catholic Relief Services (CRS) began
working to raise awareness among local priests and parishioners; beginning in 2005, the
IOM took charge of launching a massive public awareness campaign. 58 Additionally,
CRS has also been active in the creation of a high school curriculum on trafficking and,
in September 2008, received a USAID grant to help speed its development. However,
curriculum changes pose particular difficulties, as there are thirteen different Ministries
of Education in BiH, and curriculum changes must be approved by each one
individually. 59 The rulebook for dealing with victims of trafficking has also had some
implementation problems, as the Vlasic procedures are currently viewed more as
guidelines to be considered, rather than as hard and fast procedures to be followed. 60
The current SAP, which will be in effect until 2012, is based on the same five
core areas as the last SAP. However, this SAP includes some important additional goals.
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With regards to prosecution of traffickers, the current SAP not only emphasizes the need
to increase the number of perpetrators prosecuted, but also acknowledges the need to
match the severity of traffickers’ sentences with the severity of their crime. 61 (At this
time, convicted traffickers do not receive very severe sentences—an issue which will be
discussed in the next section of this paper.) The third Plan also acknowledges the
external factors that make some women particularly vulnerable to trafficking, including
“domestic violence, gender inequality and gender based violence, violence against
children, poverty, poor economic and social position of minorities, especially Roma; and
still…internally displaced persons and refugees.” 62 The present Plan makes the
important connection that part of combating trafficking means combating the factors that
contribute to its existence, and thus pledges support for programs fighting these other
social ills, as well. Recognizing the desperate need for improved, systemized information
on trafficking operations, the third SAP also calls for the creation of a database within
SIPA that would harmonize the information gathered on all identified victims of
trafficking and their experiences. 63 Shortcomings in the services currently provided to
victims are also acknowledged, such as the long periods victims must wait to give
testimony against their traffickers, the inadequacy of present repatriation measures, and
the lack of free healthcare available. Plans to remedy each of these inadequacies help to
form the SAP. Finally, the need to move from reliance on international donors to
sustainable forms of funding is discussed, and the Plan pledges to find sustainable forms
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of funding for counter-trafficking programs and victim assistance mechanisms and donor
funds continue to be withdrawn from the country. 64
Obviously, the third SAP is ambitious, and one wonders where the already cashstrapped Office of the State Coordinator will find the funds to implement all of its goals.
However, the implementation of even some of the above proposals would mark important
steps in BiH’s counter-trafficking efforts, and the Plan’s open acknowledgement of past
failures and the need for development of sustainable programs are to be commended.
Prosecutions
Despite the addition of Articles 186 and 187 to the Criminal Code, a search of the
available indictments in the State Court’s Organized Crime Division’s records since 2003
yielded only two cases in which those articles had been used. Trafficking cases can be
difficult to build or prove; instead, those who may likely be in the process of trafficking
in persons are charged only with smuggling. 65 Furthermore, because the entity codes do
not include provisions for trafficking in persons, traffickers brought before those courts
are charged with other offenses, most often forced prostitution. 66
The transition to a criminal justice system that mirrors the American one, with
investigations led by the prosecutor, as well as the presence of international prosecutors
and judges, have also been important factors to consider. Despite numerous training
sessions for judges and prosecutors overseas, some confusion remains as to how to
navigate the new system, which can lead to gaps in evidence for cases that are
64
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subsequently overturned. 67 The presence of international judges and prosecutors has
been introduced to help with this transition, as well as to keep the courts free from
suspicion of nationalist sympathies and protect national personnel from threats and
corruption. 68 International prosecutors have pushed for the prosecution of the heads of
criminal organizations, rather than their minions or those who execute operations. 69
These cases, however, are more difficult and time-consuming to build, another factor that
may contribute to a low number of prosecutions.

Explaining the Trends: External Factors
In addition to efforts on the part of the BiH government, external factors have also
affected the human trafficking situation in the country. For example, regional
developments have impacted the routes traffickers use. To view the situation from an
economic perspective, the supply and demand factors for prostitution have shifted.
Understanding the principle trends in trafficking in BiH—the decrease of foreign victims,
the increase of internal victims and victims who are minors, and the move away from
large brothels and towards more private facilities—requires consideration of these
developments.
Romania and Bulgaria: EU accession
As previously discussed, when trafficking of foreign women into BiH was at its
height in the late nineties and early ‘00s, most victims were of Moldovan, Romanian, or
Ukrainian origin. The principal trafficking routes thus began in Romania, continued
through Serbia, and then came to BiH, where women would either be forced into brothels
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or trafficked on into Western Europe as criminals took advantage of BiH’s weak border
controls. 70 However, when Romania and Bulgaria acceded to the EU in 2007, these
routes changed. For while borders between Romania and Serbia became more tightly
controlled in the years leading up to accession as Romania brought itself into line with
EU standards, crossing the Romanian border directly into Hungary, an EU country that is
party to the Schengen agreement, became far simpler. As of January 1, 2007, Hungary
and Romania commenced one-stop border checks, decreasing the barriers through which
traffickers would have to pass on their way into Western Europe. 71 Thus, there was less
of a need to take the extra detour through BiH; Western Europe had become more easily
accessible through other means. 72
Increased vulnerability of Bosnian women
While the economic and social situation in post-conflict BiH have been
challenging for all the country’s citizens, women have been particularly impacted by the
post-conflict tremors. The transition from a socialist to a market-based economy has led
to robust economic growth since the end of the war, but has not translated into increased
levels of employment across the country. However, men are often given priority for what
jobs are available, both as part of efforts to take care of war veterans and because, despite
its legislation on gender equality, BiH remains a very male-driven society in which jobs
are often handed out based on cronyism or mob connections. 73 Even as BiH reported a
reduced unemployment rate in the first months of 2008, women’s unemployment rates

70

Jovanovic interview.
People’s Daily Online, “Hungary, Romania to introduce one stop checks on border.” December 28, 2006.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200612/28/eng20061228_336335.html.
72
Ibid.
73
Interview Dubravka Kovacevic, Regional Director, CARE International. November 3, 2008.
71

24

rose, and for the first time women represented over half of the unemployed in BiH. 74
The Law on Gender Equality, which was passed in 2005, has not been equally
implemented throughout the country. Even though each municipality is required by the
legislation to have a gender center that promotes women’s empowerment, many do not,
either because of a lack of funds or a lack of political will. 75 Furthermore, a disturbing
new trend has been noted by NGOs operating in more rural areas. As families continue
to struggle to support themselves, girls are being withdrawn from school at increasing
rates and at an increasingly early age—meaning that they would not have the chance to
benefit from information presented about human trafficking in new curriculums, and that
they may be more likely to accept offers of employment elsewhere (since their families
have already gone so far as to pull them out of school to find local employment). 76 This
trend may also help to explain why an increasing percentage of trafficking victims
identified, especially trafficking victims from BiH, are minors. Finally, documented
cases of domestic violence have been on the rise over the past several years.77 While this
may be in part due to the fact that domestic violence was criminalized in 2002, it is still
an important pattern for those involved in counter-trafficking to heed. Since 2003, a
significant percentage of BiH trafficking victims have come from households with
domestic violence, suggesting links between this and a woman’s vulnerability to
trafficking, since she may understandably be more eager to leave an abusive household. 78
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International troop levels
The importance of revenue coming from international troops and peacekeepers
has been mentioned earlier in this paper; internationals are believed to have accounted for
at least 70-80 percent of the revenue at the nightclubs that sprang up around their
barracks. International troops from SFOR, IPTF, and NATO all operated with full
immunity in BiH; even though prostitution is illegal in the country, all personnel from
these groups could engage a prostitute without fear of legal consequences. 79
Furthermore, though troops were required to track other forms of organized crime, such
as trafficking in drugs and arms, they were never required to examine trafficking in
persons. 80 A habit of “turning a blind eye” to what troops did in their free time pervaded
the leadership of these organizations; as Madeleine Rees, former representative of the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bosnia, stated publicly, “They don’t want to
know about it…There is this whole ‘boys will be boys’ attitude about men visiting
brothels. There’s a culture inside the UN where you can’t criticize it. That goes all the
way to the top.” 81
In December 1995, NATO committed approximately 60,000 troops to
peacekeeping operations in BiH. By 1999 this number had decreased to 33,000; in 2002
it was 16,000. By 2004 the number of personnel was down to 7,000, and today
approximately 2,500 troops remain in the country. 82 The IPTF arrived in December 2006
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with approximately 1,411 inspectors and left the country in 2002. 83 As troop levels
decreased, local human rights workers noted that bars and nightclubs began to close their
doors. Rees wrote, “Doboj used to have some of the most notorious night bars in the area
and it was known that there was considerable international use. SFOR left the area at the
end of last year and there are now no night bars at all.” 84 She also commented, “You
could plot the closure of the night bars with the removal of troops and the ending of [UN]
IPTF.” 85 Such comments, along with the dramatic drop in the number of bars and
nightclubs still in operation in BiH, leave little doubt that the presence of international
peacekeepers contributed significantly to the expansion of human trafficking activity in
the region, and that their subsequent absence has led to a drop in demand and, thus,
activity.

Organized Crime: Current Role and Potential for Further Exploitation
Most human trafficking research and counter-trafficking efforts to date have
approached the issue from a victim-based perspective. Statistical data centers on victim
profiles; funds for counter-trafficking efforts usually go to programs supporting victim
reintegration or reducing the vulnerabilities of potential victims. However, victims are
only one side of the human trafficking equation. A thorough, balanced approach to
counter-trafficking must also target the traffickers themselves, paying attention to the
opportunities available for criminals to exploit and learning their modus operandi. With
this in mind, the rest of this paper will be devoted to a discussion of who traffickers are
and the weaknesses in BiH institutions upon which they can most easily prey.
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Trafficker profile
Many of BiH’s most prominent organized criminals began their careers in petty
crime during the war. 86 In addition to trafficking in people, organized crime networks
also participate in drug trafficking, gun running, copyright piracy, illicit logging, and
organ smuggling. 87 The nature of criminal networks themselves has shifted along with
the nature of their modus operandi. As traffickers have been able to operate with a lesser
degree of impunity, there has been a move away from the classic hierarchical, pyramid
structure of organized crime groups, with a single controlling boss at the top and a
number of lesser operatives below. Rather, crime networks now appear to be operating
as loose networks that are extremely flexible, able to quickly move their operations
according to the risks and markets in different areas. 88 The networks usually organize
their operations along three levels: “high level” criminals, who set prices and finance the
cost of transfer victims but rarely become involved in the actual movement of people;
“mid level” criminals, who operate at strategic geographical areas (usually borders) and
are commissioned by high level groups to manage operations (transportation, production
of false documents, bribery of border officials); and “low level” criminals, unskilled
groups in charge of transporting and delivering victims. 89 Some criminals are former or
current government officials, able to use their expertise and connections to improve
criminal network operations. 90 Crime groups are demonstrating increasingly professional
behavior, reinvesting the profits from human trafficking operations into other trafficking
86

Trifunovic, Darko. “Special Report: Terrorism and Organized Crime in South-Eastern Europe: The Case
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sanzak, and Kosovo,” Defense and Foreign Affairs/International Strategic Studies
Association. Belgrade: March 1, 2007.
87
Ibid.
88
Surtees, Rebecca. “Traffickers and Trafficking in Southern and Eastern Europe: Considering the Other
Side of Human Trafficking.” European Journal of Criminology, Volume 5(1). London: 2008. pp 48.
89
Ibid, pp 47.
90
Surtees, pp 49.

28

ventures and some legitimate businesses, thus greatly expanding their spheres of
influence. 91
Corruption in BiH
Perhaps the most exploitable condition for traffickers in BiH is the rampant
corruption that can be found at every level of the country’s government and law
enforcement bodies. After the war, the political vacuum in BiH was filled by “a political
elite working within a tight-knit network of informal economic ties. This political elite
habitually relied on ethnic divisions and enmity to disguise its corrupt profit-seeking
objectives.” 92 Because of BiH’s fourteen levels of government, criminals have more
potential points of contact with civil servants than in more stream-lined bureaucracies. 93
Businesses, in order to operate in multiple municipalities and cantons, must also interface
more with government officials, thus furthering corruption’s potential spread. 94
Of particular import to traffickers is the corruption to be found in the judicial
system and amongst police forces. Surveys have shown that both individuals and
businesses perceive the judiciary as highly corrupt. 95 While Transparency International
reports have stated that judicial corruption takes place most often as bribes to resolve
cases before their turn or to delay rulings before appellate courts, Deputy Chief
Prosecutor for Organized Crime Drew Engel suspects that some judges may, indeed, be
on the payrolls of criminals in return for giving favorable rulings. 96 Other officials
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involved in the extensive training programs which have recently been put in place for
Bosnian judges have also related stories of judges receiving threats if they did not rule
favorably in certain cases. 97 With regards to law enforcement agencies, both individuals
and citizens perceive police as one of the most corrupt groups in the country. 98
According to Brian Donley, chief EU advisor to SIPA, many of the senior police officers
are appointed by politicians. Political corruption thus seeps into these appointments, and
chiefs seeking to act independently of certain politicians’ wishes are immediately
replaced. 99 Politicization of the police force creates more avenues of influence for
criminals into law enforcement agencies, given the political ties top organized criminals
possess.
Within the judicial sphere, much criticism has been aimed at the courts for
handing out sentences that are too lenient given the nature of the crime. For example, the
primary defendant in one of the two trafficking cases mentioned above, which involved
the trafficking of eight women for sexual exploitation, was sentenced to ten years in
prison. 100 This, however, is partly due to the nature of the criminal justice system in BiH,
which simply does not impose sentences as strict as those seen in the United States. 101
More suspect, then, has been the high rate of sentences that have been reduced or
suspended, or verdicts that have been overturned, on appeal. 102 Out of 77 sentences
handed out in 2007, 54 were revoked or modified on appeal. Indeed, in the trafficking
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case referred to above, the convictions of all those involved were later overturned on
appeal. 103
Legal loopholes
When Articles 186 and 187 were added to the Criminal Code of BiH in 2003, it
was considered a victory for activists and an important step in counter-trafficking
efforts. 104 However, none of the entity-level codes include provisions for human
trafficking. Instead, they must prosecute traffickers under related charges, such as forced
prostitution or forgery of documents. 105 Even though the entity codes are required to
harmonize with the state-wide code, none of the entities have made any indication that
they will be including provisions for human trafficking in the future. 106
For cases in which people are trafficked across borders, this is not an issue,
because transnational crime would necessarily come under the jurisdiction of the state
court. 107 However, cases involving internal trafficking would fall under the jurisdiction
of entity courts—yet there is currently no human trafficking law in these courts under
which criminals could be prosecuted. With the rise in internal victims of trafficking, it
appears traffickers may be emboldened by this legal loophole. When this was pointed
out to a judicial advisor at the US Embassy, she confirmed that it did indeed seem as
though there was a gap in the system. 108
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Police weaknesses
Though the establishment of the SBS has led to the overall strengthening of
borders, this is still an area that requires much attention. SBS needs at least 500 more
officers before it reaches its capacity employment; according to Schengen standards,
there should be 50% more border patrol officers than there currently are. 109 There are
still some border checkpoints that consist of little more than a single guard and a barrier,
with no electronic equipment whatsoever. 110 Such equipment could be useful in tracking
who is trying to cross the border and in verifying the documentation of those who do.
Though trafficking of foreign women into the country has significantly slowed, if borders
are sufficiently weak then criminals may decide to reopen those transnational routes.
And though border issues are less relevant for internal trafficking, the question of
jurisdiction lines is highly relevant. Because there are so many separate police forces in
BiH—different ones for every municipality—and because there is so little coordination
between them, determining who is responsible for certain investigations often proves to
be a challenge. 111
The equipment and technology available to most police officers in BiH is also
insufficient to pursue sophisticated organized criminals. Neither an electronic database
for intelligence gathered on organized crime nor any sort of DNA database exist in BiH.
The fingerprint database is often useless, since traffickers are rarely added to it and police
are often reluctant to take fingerprints of suspects unless directly ordered to do so by a
prosecutor. 112 To bring down organized crime networks, sufficient evidence and ongoing
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documentation of activities are essential. Without the proper technology—and indeed, in
rural areas police forces are often so strapped for funds that they can do little more than
take photographs of a crime scene—the necessary caliber of proof is almost impossible to
procure. This increases criminals’ ability to operate nearly invisibly, especially in rural
areas where particularly vulnerable populations are to be found.
Extreme nationalism
Since the failure of Constitutional reforms in October 2006 that would have
created a more centralized government and lodged more authority with state-wide
institutions, extreme nationalism has once again been on the rise in BiH. 113 The
reluctance of politicians, even those serving at the national level, to relinquish power to
state institutions—be they the police, the courts, or the legislature—keeps those
institutions weak and relatively ineffective. 114 In this sort of political environment, one
that is crippled by internal squabbling and reluctance to work together, a power vacuum
is created: one that may be easily filled by organized crime, especially given the degree
of corruption in politics and business in BiH. Because of the country’s relatively weak
economic status, individual citizens are less empowered to demand an effective and
transparent civil service and more focused on making their own personal ends meet.
Furthermore, the rise of nationalism decreases citizen contributions to police
investigations: people are less likely to tip off those belonging to their own national
group, and some criminals who began their activities during the war have maintained the
image of a war hero working for the betterment of their own people. 115 In a state where
individuals are reluctant to acknowledge crime for what it is, where politicians and other
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civil servants are eager to keep state institutions weak and susceptible to corruption, and
where social divisions are deepening, organized crime may be expected flourish.

Conclusion
Since the creation of the first State Action Plan in 2001, BiH has worked hard to
combat human trafficking across its borders. Through a combination of government
efforts and more favorable external circumstances, trafficking of foreign women into the
country has slowed considerably. Unfortunately, this does not mean that trafficking in
persons is no longer an issue in BiH. Instead, it is now time for the country to focus its
efforts on combating trafficking within its borders. Criminals’ more discreet methods,
police’s tight budgets, and prosecutors’ already-heavy caseloads will make this difficult.
The continued spread of corruption, dire economic conditions, and the further
entrenchment of organized crime could make it much more so. Indeed, in a country
where few matters transcend national identities and political rivalries, perhaps the key to
stopping criminals and preventing human trafficking is translating the good will of those
working on the issue into effective cooperation in all levels of government—the kind of
cooperation that leads to good governance and a more secure environment for all the
citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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